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Reimaging the Ombudsman:
An Appraisal
An ombudsman program can serve
as a useful alternative to the court
system for nursing-home residents.
This article examines issues related to
the ombudsman's role in long-term
care facilities, including purpose,
criticisms, and local and national

During the adaptation to more crowded city conditions, older, less-productive family members have lost
their purpose. They are often seen as ineffective, superfluous, to be tolerated if necessary, but preferably
to be disposed of in some acceptable manner. Older
people have come to see themselves as being in the
way and unproductive. They feel guilty and are willing to participate in their own disenfranchisement as
members of the family and of society. They have been
made to accept isolation, abandonment, or incarceration. In short, yesterday's elders still had enough
bargaining points left to negotiate a dignified passage
from this life to the realm of the dead. Today's elders
do not.'

recommendations.
October 30, 2000:

By Beth Elsendrath

Congressional investigators said today that they had
found widespread violations of federal health and safety
standards at nursing homes . . . . [T]hey ...found
"serious deficiencies" in about seventy percent of nursing homes in Texas, [and] similar problems at... more
than half of the homes in Chicago, Los Angeles and
2
the San Francisco Bay Area.

Introduction

Beth Eisendratbis an editor of the Elder's Advisor and
will graduate with a Juris Doctor degree from
Marquette University Law School in May 2002. She
plans a practice in elder law. She would like to thank
Professor Alison Barnes for her suggestions on this
article.

Approximately one and one half million people
currently reside in 17,000 nursing homes across
the nation.3 Yet, a recent study by congressional investigators discovered "widespread violations of
federal health and safety standards at nursing homes
in Texas, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, and
California.'4
Moreover, sweeping changes to the healthcare
system involving the switch to managed care and
consolidation of nursing homes in the last decade
have disrupted the long-term care environment, with
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more shifts likely in the next ten years.' One example
of that future change is the alteration of nursing homes
from long-term care facilities to subacute facilities with
concomitant changes in cost-containment structures.6
Nursing-home residents rarely bring cases to
court. They may be hesitant to bring suit for fear of
retaliation, they may be unable to sue due to a physical or mental disability, or they may simply lack the
logistical means to leave the nursing home to hire a
lawyer. An ombudsman program often serves as a
useful alternative to the court system for nursinghome residents. 7 However, at a time when
nursing-home use is projected to expand by seventysix percent in the next three decades, it is essential to
examine what the ombudsman role is and whether
the mandates of the Older Americans Act, which
requires states to have ombudsman programs, are
being fulfilled. 8
Clearly, ombudsmen fulfill a vital role for residents adversely affected by change, but
reorganization would seem to be in order if the
United States hopes to follow the statutory provisions of the Older Americans Act. The Act calls for
giving responsibility to
An individual who will, on a full-time basis (i) investigate and resolve complaints made by or on behalf of
older individuals who are residents of long-term care
facilities relating to action, inaction, or decisions of
providers, or their representatives, of long-term care
services, of public agencies, or of social service agencies, which may adversely affect the health, safety,
welfare, or rights of such residents.9

This article looks at the issues surrounding the
ombudsman's role in long-term care facilities. Part
II examines the history and purpose of the classic
ombudsman role. Part III summarizes the federal
long-term care ombudsman program as authorized
in the Older Americans Act, while Part IV explores
criticisms of ombudsmen and ombudsman programs
in general. Part V describes the Wisconsin long-term
care ombudsman program and criticisms of it. Part
VI concludes with a look at local and national recommendations for ombudsman programs.
History and Purpose of the Classic
Ombudsman
An ombudsman is "a third party who intervenes in
addressing concerns of individuals or dependent

groups in relation to powerful organizations or bureaucracies. " 10 The function of the ombudsman dates
to Egyptian times, when pharaohs used complaint
agents in their courts.11 In 1809, Sweden's Parliament appointed a "Justitieombudsman," whose duty
was to protect citizens' rights during disagreements
12
with government entities.
The role later evolved into that of an intermediary
who resolves citizens' complaints about unethical or
illegal government behavior.13 These appointed national
ombudsmen report to the head of state or to the parliament. They settle citizen grievances and serve as links
to bureaucracies. 14 Finland adopted the office of the
ombudsman in 1919, and Denmark instituted an office of ombudsman in 1955. By the 1960s, many other
countries had adopted a national ombudsman model,
including New Zealand, France, Hong Kong, and the
United Kingdom." In the United States, the ombudsman is frequently used in long-term care settings,
universities, and private corporations.16
The early Scandinavian ombudsman model is
often called the "classic" model. In the classic ombudsman model, the ombudsman acts as an
autonomous liaison defending the interests of citi17
zens against the rival claims of the government.
Professor Paul R. Verkuil notes three key features of
the classic ombudsman:
1. The Ombudsman is an independent and nonpartisan officer of the legislature, usually
provided for within the constitution, who
supervises the administration;
2. The Ombudsman deals with specific complaints from the public against administrative
injustice and maladministration;
3. The Ombudsman has the power to investigate, criticize and publicize, but not to
reverse, administration action."i
The classic ombudsman concentrates on seeking
solutions that dispel future conflicts, rather than on
implementing punitive measures. She acts as a neutral
observer, neither wholly in the camp of the administration nor on the side of the private individual.19
The following factors should be weighed in creation and evaluation of the ombudsman within the
larger system:
The person who performs the role of ombudsman must
be completely neutral, both in fact and in appearance.
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The neutrality of the ombudsman should be protected
by the structure of the position. The ombudsman
should have access to all levels and departments, and
all non-privileged, relevant records within an organization . . . Various means should be used to educate
others about the functions and benefits of the ombudsman... Persons using the ombudsman must be assured
of complete privacy and confidentiality of conversa20
tions and the ombudsman's files.

Purposes of the Ombudsman
The ombudsman's role has developed as agency and
government ranks have grown in complexity and
number. Benefits of the ombudsman system include
"greater flexibility, accessibility, cost effectiveness and
a better fit with preventive ...

orientations to safe-

guarding the interests of the individual."21 One early
authority, Walter Gellhorn, saw the ombudsman's
role as supplementary to, rather than a substitute
22
for, existing methods of handling injustices.
When the ombudsman came to the United States,
the role evolved from the classic model into a more
active, localized model known as the "hybrid" ombudsman. 2' The hybrid ombudsman has a more fluid
role that moves from neutral mediator to energetic
ally.24 Author Jeffrey Kahana theorizes that the classic ombudsman role was appropriate for
consensus-based societies; in contrast, the United
States is more conflict-ridden, and therefore a more
zealous agent is needed. 21Where the classic ombudsman concentrated on designing methods with which
to avoid conflict, the hybrid ombudsman's functional
vocabulary includes shuttle diplomacy and negotiation. 6 The hybrid ombudsman can switch between
"impartial umpire [and] partisan advocate. "27
The eagerness with which the United States has
adopted the hybrid model illustrates a widespread
concern. Professor Shirley Weigand traces this interest to legislators' proposals to adopt the ombudsman
2
model to assist in handling citizens' complaints. 1
Today, the United States has more ombudsmen than
any country in the world. Ombudsmen are located
in 4,000 hospitals, businesses, newspapers, and private organizations.2 9
Rationale
An ombudsman can use fluid and flexible methods
of problem-solving that the parties might see as less
intimidating than traditional judicial methods. Ombudsmen are not restricted to adjudicatory
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dichotomies of one party triumphing while the other
party fails.30 The ombudsman also is economical
when compared with the cost of litigation in terms
of both money and time. 3' However, she does not
32
generally have the power to bring lawsuits.
Different parties see the ombudsman as serving
their particular individual interests: The resident sees
an advocate who will navigate the system, the bureaucrat sees a cost-effective way of addressing a set
of problems, and the government agency sees om33
budsmen as fulfilling a regulatory role.
Long-Term Care Ombudsman Program
In the United States
The Federal Long-Term Care Ombudsman Program
began in 1972 as a five-state Public Health Service
demonstration project. 34 The states, including Wisconsin, were contracted to create nursing- home
ombudsman programs. The following year, the experimental programs were positioned "within the
infrastructure of the 'aging network' of state and area
agencies on aging.' 3 Four years later, in the Older
Americans Act, Congress mandated that each state
36
institute a Long-Term Care Ombudsman Program.
Currently, approximately 865 paid ombudsmen
work in programs in fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. All the programs operate
differently in their funding and position in each state's
organizational structure. Approximately 1,500 ombudsmen (including volunteers) operate within the
long-term care environment. 37 In 1996, nearly 180,000
complaints from 154,000 nursing home residents (and
38
others) were managed by ombudsmen.
Funding for the ombudsman program issues
comes from diverse sources, although the Older
Americans Act provides the bulk of funding. Other
financing comes from state and local governments,
area agencies on aging, the United Way, and
39
foundations.
The purpose of these programs is to "identify,
investigate, and resolve complaints that are made by,
or on behalf of, residents," "provide services to assist.., in protecting the health, safety, welfare, and
rights of the residents," "inform the residents about
the means of obtaining services," and "represent the
interests of the residents before governmental agencies and seek administrative, legal and other
40
remedies.
Ombudsman programs "arose in response to
the widespread perception of problems in nursing
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facility quality." 41 For example, a need arose to "give
voice to resident grievances in a way that allow[ed]
the administration to save face and d[id] not result
in dismissal of the resident. ' 42 As a United States
Senate committee noted,
The primary role of long-term care ombudsmen is that
of consumer advocate, and they are not limited to responding to complaints about the quality of care.
Problems with public entitlements, guardianships, or any
number of issues that a nursing home resident may en43
counter are within the jurisdiction of the ombudsman.

The long-term care ombudsman acts to resolve
problems between residents and their families and
nursing homes. She also advocates for residents with
the state administration that oversees elderly services.
Ombudsmen function as mediators, problem-solvers, and sometimes as publicists and educators.
However, despite these numerous roles, there is no
44
precise job description for the ombudsman.
The Institute of Medicine describes examples of
changes promoted by ombudsman programs (along
with other groups) as follows:
[E]nactment of the federal Nursing Home Reform Law
of 1987 . . . ; increased personal needs allowances;
protections from involuntary discharge and room transfers; reduced use of physical restraints; improved
building and safety standards; increased state funding
for inspection and surveying of LTC [long-term care]
facilities; reduced use of psychotropic medications;
better licensing oversight of healthcare professionals;
increased use of advance directives; stronger LTC staff
competencies and sensitivities; and empowerment of
residents through stronger resident and family gover45
nance structures.

Criticisms of Ombudsmen and
Ombudsman Programs
Many criticisms of ombudsman programs have ex46
isted in the United States since their beginning here,
even as the ombudsman's unusual role has evolved
to meet specific societal needs for an arbiter, advocate, and mediator.47 The Institute of Medicine
reported in its 1994 study that "[o]bstacles to effective performance include inadequate funding,
resulting staff shortages, low salary levels for paid
staff, [and] structural conflicts of interest that limit
the ability to act. "48

A common criticism of ombudsmen is that an
appointed ombudsman may hesitate to criticize other
areas within the agency or government structure
because of concerns over job security.49 Moreover,
the dual mediation and trouble-shooting functions
of ombudsmen may conflict.50 A related conflictbased criticism notes the "possibility of uninformed
and inconsistent decisions that are based on the
ombudsman's own professional values or personal
opinions rather than on the legal and ethical standards the service provider must meet." 51
Professor John J. Regan also found the
ombudsman's shape-shifting mix of roles questionable. In his view, the advocacy role was disjunctive
with the ombudsman's neutral role, and the amorphous nature of the two identities "call[ed] into
question whether the ombudsman is the appropriate person to achieve [the] goals" of advancing the
interests of the elderly.5 2 For example, sometimes the
necessity to nurture ongoing dialog with nursing facilities means that the ombudsman cannot be as direct
and firm as might be the case if the relationship were
transitory.
Relatedly, author Kahana sees a possibility for
the filing of frivolous complaints since ombudsmen,
unlike the courts, may be accessed for free. 3 A lonely
nursing-home resident may contact an ombudsman
simply to get needed attention. In addition, those
surrounding the ombudsman may see her as impotent since she lacks the power to punish.5 4 Others
may perceive a "lack of authority, which may hinder
55
enforcing recommendations."
An appointed ombudsman's association with a
governor gives visibility and political status. However, she is often seen as linked to the governor rather
than as an independent entity.5 6 Professor Regan
believed that if the office of ombudsman were appointed by a governor, true autonomy might not be
s7
realized.
The ombudsman's role, meanwhile, also can
have a coercive element. Regan noted that in the
process of manufacturing compromise, an ombudsman may simply adjust the fit, tailoring the
complaining party to a dreary status quo and dissuading decision-makers from taking binding
action.5 8 Similarly, complaints directed at the ombudsman may serve to deflect the charge from its
appropriate target, thus protecting that which is com59
plained about.
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Wisconsin's Long-Term Care Ombudsman
Program: An Example Examined
The Wisconsin long-term care ombudsman program
came into being in 1978 as a component of the Office of the Lieutenant Governor.6 ° Of those early
years, volunteer ombudsman coordinator Kellie
Miller McLellan recounts, "We used to have the
'midnight raiders'-the ombudsman would come
into the nursing home at five o'clock or even later,
to see what he could see, horrible stuff. Now you
can see the horrible stuff and not have to come in
there at midnight."6 1
Three years later, the Wisconsin Board on Aging
and Long-Term Care was created as an umbrella
organization to house the Wisconsin Ombudsman
Program. 62 Kevin Zwart is a Medigap Insurance
counselor with the Medigap Helpline Program, also
located within the Board on Aging and Long-Term
Care. He remarks, "The movement of the ombudsman out of the Lieutenant Governor's office, and
the start of the Board, that all happened because
the
ombudsmen started getting . . . notoriety-so
63
Governor wanted to get more of the credit.
In Wisconsin, the ombudsman conforms to federal provisions in being an advocate rather than a
neutral. 64 Notwithstanding, the Wisconsin Board diverges from the conventional view of the long-term
care ombudsman: While the customary view of the
affiliation is that both the nursing-home resident and
her or his family are clients of the ombudsman, the
Wisconsin Board on Aging and Long-Term Care views
solely the resident as the ombudsman's client.65 This
position is not universally held within the Wisconsin
Ombudsman Program. For example, volunteer coordinator Miller McLellan believes that while residents
are the ombudsman's primary clients, the volunteers
66
may respond to residents' families as well.
Wisconsin has fifteen full-time, paid ombudsmen;
of those, five are in Milwaukee. A total of sixty-five
volunteer ombudsmen are concentrated in four counties.67 One intake coordinator, also an ombudsman,
fields questions and returns phone calls on a full-time
basis. 68 The number of clients served by the program
nearly doubled to 12,000 clients between 1996 and
1999.69 Complaints increased by one-third over the
same period, 70 and during that period, reports of abuse
71
and other serious incidents consistently increased.
The most recent two-year operating budget of
the Wisconsin Board on Aging and Long-Term Care
was approximately $2.3 million for 1997-1999. State

taxes provide approximately half of the budget; nearly
one-quarter comes from the federal Older Americans
Act and the Healthcare Financing Administration
(HCFA). The balance of the budget comes from a segregated fund in the Office of the Commissioner of
Insurance and from private foundations. 72 In the past
biennium, three ombudsmen positions were created,
73
including the full-time phone ombudsman position.
Goals
The Institute of Medicine report asserts that "[nJot
all residents of long-term care facilities in need of
advocacy assistance have meaningful access to the
services of an ombudsman." 74 Yet one key goal of
the Wisconsin Ombudsman Program is to implement
7
site visits to all nursing homes by ombudsmen. 1
Bill Donaldson, the legal counsel for the Board
on Aging and Long-Term Care, states, "We are concerned with monitoring rules and implementation.
In Wisconsin, we take monitoring as seriously as
other functions." 76 Kevin Zwart, a Medigap Helpline
counselor, agrees: "Representation in the facilities is
real important. We're preventative. Volunteers are
77
in there every week."
The high value placed on site-visit consistency
by the program echoes the emphasis accorded by the
Senate Committee on Aging: "A major objective of
the ombudsmen is to establish a regular presence in
long-term care facilities, so they can become well
acquainted with the residents, the employees, and
the workings of the facility. This presence is important as it helps the ombudsman establish credibility
7' 8
and trust.
Other Wisconsin Ombudsman Program goals
include increasing access to ombudsman services,
acquiring more ombudsman volunteers to make regular site visits to long-term care facilities, 79 and
improving residents' quality of life. 0 The program
issues a "self-evaluation that takes the form of a biennial report.. . highlight[ing] what the agency has
done well and what it's done not so well at, and it
makes recommendations.""
Former long-term care ombudsman Jean Trimble
observes that ombudsmen work best as educators.
"Talking to families about residents' rights, talking
82
to staff about bioethics, talking to media.
Current Operations
Forty nursing homes in Wisconsin (approximately
ten percent of the total number of state facilities)
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have filed for Chapter Eleven bankruptcy protection
over the last two years. Because the Wisconsin Ombudsman Program's aims include responding to
resource cutbacks in nursing facilities, 3 the large
number of facilities undergoing Chapter Eleven re84
organization receive harder scrutiny.
Still, the long-term care environment in Wisconsin is insecure. Volunteer Coordinator Kellie Miller
McLellan notes, "There are heartbreaking stories
about nursing homes going through bankruptcy."
She adds that aides from one insolvent nursing home
worked without pay because of their commitment
to the residents. Nonetheless, "[w]hen this happens,
we have to find places to transfer the residents.""5
Along with the flux in the long-term care environments, chronic staffing shortages in nursing
facilities add to the atmosphere of instability. Short
staffing signals a need for increased alertness by the
visiting ombudsmen. Former long-term care ombudsman Jean Trimble calls short staffing "[t]he most
frustrating chronic nursing home problem... it's all
over the place ... It's frustrating to keep raising the
86
issue."
Another program concern involves the
ombudsman's need to command respect while simultaneously improving relations with the facilities.
Trimble believes that the ombudsman program is
taken more seriously "since the Omnibus Reconciliation Budget Act of 1987... The local level also got
more important-as ombudsmen got more experienced, as we'd been there longer, we got taken more
87
seriously."
Yet Rachel Selking, regional ombudsman for the
Milwaukee area, comments, "At some facilities, it
doesn't matter what you say-they still won't take
the ombudsmen seriously. It just depends on the philosophy of the individual facility. And then, we have
some facilities that call asking for advice." 8 The
Board's attorney, Donaldson, says that a number of
nursing facilities have even attempted to challenge
the ombudsmen's right to visit.8 9 "The statutory language is, 'Ombudsmen have a right to visit and be
there without notice at any time,"' he says. "It's very
explicit." 90
Thus, the ombudsman's role necessitates diplomacy. Officials observe that many nursing homes see
the ombudsmen as outsiders, rather than as the residents' representatives. Officials also comment that
some facilities view ombudsmen as overly inquisitive, attempting to require unnecessary registrations

of ombudsmen as they enter the nursing home: "They
feel threatened." 91
Milwaukee ombudsman Selking finds that some
facilities are open to criticism, but others remain intransigent. She adds, "We see things with the
residents, ranging from inappropriate discharges to
abuse to incontinence; people lying there without
being changed for hours." 92 Zwart, meanwhile, notes
that the regular presence of the program fosters a
higher level of performance from staff and administration. 93
If a disagreement cannot be settled, the ombudsmen have alternatives. Donaldson asserts:
We start out with negotiation and mediation. We frame
the problem so everyone is looking at it the same way.
Then, if that doesn't work out, the ombudsman refers
the problem to law enforcement or the district attorney or the Bureau of Quality Assurance-to a
regulatory agency. We don't have any regulatory enforcement capability.9 4

Former ombudsman Trimble adds:
Ombudsmen don't have sanction power, so we were
taken more seriously as we used what we did have.
Nursing homes followed the ombudsman's recommendations because they were a better alternative than having
the surveyors in ... It took a while for surveyors to see
the utility of ombudsmen, because when we would criti5
cize the surveyors, they'd see us as "bitches."

Milwaukee ombudsman Selking finds that she
can call on colleagues, use state codes, or threaten to
refer problems to the Bureau of Quality Assurance
to resolve disagreement. "Right now, we're studying whether the Bureau is effective. We also have the
federal surveyors. But they are sparse-only three
'96
for the whole region.
Furthermore, the great changes to the healthcare
system occasioned by the healthcare industry's switch
to managed care have altered the Wisconsin longterm care environment. As the Institute of Medicine
has noted, "The increasing growth and dominance
of managed-care organizations raise complex issues
for Long-Term care." 97 For example, Medigap Insurance counselor Kevin Zwart says that the last
decade brought a consolidation trend to the nursing-home industry that has the potential to erode
the quality of healthcare. 9
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Milwaukee ombudsman Selking adds that the
recent orientation of the long-term care industry toward increasingly larger corporations has brought a
corresponding impersonal element.9 She contends that
some nursing homes funnel their resources into marketing rather than address staffing problems: "[Slome
of these places have beautiful facilities, but the part
that's beautiful, the residents never get to see."' 100

Volunteer Ombudsman Program
Nationwide, volunteer ombudsmen number approximately 7,000.01 Institute of Medicine officials assert
that a positive correlation exists between the use of
ombudsman volunteers and the "number of complaints made and resolved." 10 2 Wisconsin Board on
Aging and Long-Term Care legal counsel Donaldson
says that some states have a predominantly volunteer ombudsman base, whereas Wisconsin emphasizes professional ombudsmen since they can be
trained more intensively. 10 3
Since a key goal of the six-year-old program is
to improve the regularity of nursing-home visits,
volunteers make trips at least weekly to thirty-five
10 4
facilities.
Trimble, the former Long-Term care ombudsman, remarks that volunteers are time-intensive and
require much effort to train, but that they are good
for handling day-to-day aspects of the residents' lives,
such as quality of meals and regular access to fluids.105 As Volunteer Ombudsman Director Miller
McLellan observes, "The regular ombudsman investigates the tough stuff." 1 6
In their one-on-one relations with nursing home
residents, volunteers are constrained by layers of
regulation. As a staff member comments, liability
problems prevent the volunteers from working in a
hands-on manner.
Volunteers may also be constrained by forces
inside the ombudsman program itself. Trimble contends that "[t]here's also a fear of regional
ombudsmen that if volunteers get stronger, they'd
get rid of the regional ombudsmen-and that would
10 7
be terrible.'

Criticisms of Wisconsin's Ombudsman
Program
In Wisconsin, some officials believe that more funding would help in raising the quality of the
ombudsman program.10 Similarly, the Institute of
Medicine concluded that "resources are not adequate
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for each state LTC (long-term care) ombudsman program to perform at a level that ensures compliance
with even the basic, decade-old mandates of the OAA
(Older Americans Act) ombudsman program. "'09
Mitch Hagopian, an attorney with the Coalition
of Wisconsin Aging Groups, says:
We run into people who contact benefit specialists because the ombudsman program has declined to serve
them for some reason. [T]he ombudsman program
sometimes has taken the side of the facility or their
performance for the resident is lackluster. [For example,
in one case,] the daughter [of a resident complained so
much that she] wore out the facility, and the ombudsman got tired of her too, so we got the case. There was
a personal conflict between the ombudsman and the
resident." 0

Former ombudsman Trimble believes that
Wisconsin is out of compliance with federal regulations in at least two ways."' First, federal regulations
state that long-term care ombudsmen must have no
conflicts of interest.1 2 But as the Institute of Medicine notes, the "politically charged environment" in
which ombudsmen operate means that "most state
and local ombudsman programs are subject to one
or more

. . .

conflicts of interest

. .

. All conflicts of

interest work to the disadvantage of the vulnerable
client."113
Trimble argues that for the Director of the Board
on Aging and Long-Term Care to double as head
ombudsman, as the Wisconsin statute mandates, is
a conflict of interest."4 The ombudsman cannot easily make recommendations and criticisms of the
Board if he is simultaneously the head of the Board,
she believes.
Furthermore, the federal regulation stipulates
that "[t]he [head] Ombudsman shall serve on fulltime basis . . .

""i

If the ombudsman has another

job description-as director of the Board overseeing
not only the Ombudsman Program and the Medigap
Helpline Program, but also lobbying at the Capitol
as Director of the Board on Aging and Long-Term
Care-he is not full time and thus does not conform
to the federal statute.
The current Wisconsin statute stipulates that the
same person must hold both positions." 6 This was
not always the case; in contrast, the 1987-1988 statute makes no such stipulation that the same person
7
holds both positions."

56
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In Trimble's view, the second way in which Wisconsin is federally noncompliant is that the legal counsel
to the Board on Aging cannot bring suits to the Court
of Appeals as he is supposed to."' She asserts that when
nursing homes involuntarily discharge a resident over
that resident's objections, the discharge goes to a "fair
hearing" handled by non-attorneys, and then to appellate court. She was told that the legal counsel to the
Board was unable to bring cases to appellate court." 9
Along the same lines, it is alleged that the original legal
counsel subpoenaed the governor and was fired; after
that, the Board reduced the power of the legal counsel.' 20 Trimble asserts, "The ombudsman doesn't take
2
111
the place of the legal advocate.'
Such a claim is consistent with the finding of the
Institute of Medicine that "[e]xcept in a very few
states, State Units on Aging have not fulfilled their
responsibility to ensure adequate and independent
legal counsel is available to the ombudsman programs for the purpose of providing advice and
' 22
counsel related to Long-Term care residents."'
Mitch Hagopian, attorney for the Coalition of
Wisconsin Aging Groups, believes that the legal counsel should advocate for residents. Hagopian says:
[T]he ombudsmen are hired as social workers, not attorneys . . . The first thing the [first] counsel did after
being named legal counsel, was sue the governor and
depose him. So a nonconfrontational guy was hired and
they changed the law, and the legal counsel was named
legal counsel for the agency, not the residents. This legal
counsel is a real nice guy; he spends a lot of time keeping
up with the business at the Capitol, he knows the status
of every bill, but his job shouldn't be advocate for the
agency but advocate for the residents... It's important

that their [ombudsman program's] legal counsel be evaluated and expanded. If they wanted to make the
ombudsman program something that would actually deal
with residents' rights, they need to strengthen the legal

counsel ... Nursing homes assume there's no one to
represent those that they kick out. I have yet to see someone get evicted once a lawyer is involved. It cost the
facility $40,000 to get legal representation in [one] proceeding, that really makes them think about doing that
sort of thing again ... When the social workers [who
are ombudsmen] are finished negotiating and

schmoozing, it's a paper tiger.' 3
Former ombudsman Trimble further alleges that
the first director of the State Ombudsman program

was terminated from the program because of activism and advocacy. She adds, "The problem with the
Board is that everyone is tied in some way to the
governor."
Program Needs
The Wisconsin Board On Aging and Long-Term Care
plans to enlarge operations by hiring two more volunteer ombudsman coordinators for the Milwaukee
and Fox River Valley areas.124 The Board is also slated
to increase the pay of regional ombudsmen. Currently, two of the state's fourteen regional
ombudsman positions are vacant, and regional ombudsmen and staff attribute the vacancies to
comparatively low pay in relation to the challenges
125
of the job.
The ombudsman program currently has one fulltime supervisor whose duty it is to consult on cases,
plan staff training, and monitor quality. 126 The Board
intends to double the supervisors on staff, to two
full-time supervisors.
In addition, the ombudsman program plans to
continue a practice of closely observing facilities that
have undergone problems, to make a priority of assuring a smooth transition to residents and their
127
families when a facility must close.
According to the Wisconsin Board On Aging and
Long-Term Care,
More than ten percent of the nursing home beds in
Wisconsin have been affected by bankruptcy of their
corporate owners... Ombudsmen are made aware of
situations where facilities are known to be experiencing financial difficulties and they ... pay ...attention
to care and treatment factors that may signal ... deterioration in a provider's ability to care for the residents
...monitor[ing] for signs of inconsistent care, inadequate staffing, supplies, or other indications of
12
financial instability. '

The major system-wide problem that ex-ombudsman Trimble sees is a lack of ombudsmen to oversee
nursing homes, home healthcare and other programs. 1 29 This view is shared by the volunteer
ombudsman coordinator. 13 0
Recommendations
The Wisconsin Board on Aging and Long-Term Care
must lobby for greater federal oversight of the ombudsman system, both locally and nationally.
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Stronger federal oversight would in turn strengthen
Wisconsin standards, allowing the Wisconsin program to more easily negotiate to improve nursing
facility standards, increase local funding and achieve
its other goals.
On the local level, biweekly visits to all nursing
homes are necessary to assure quality and accountability. As the volunteer ombudsman coordinator
noted, the program is still in the process of developing a schedule of regular visits.'
In addition, the Wisconsin ombudsman program
would benefit from autonomy from the Board on
Aging and Long-Term Care. The separation of the
program would help ombudsmen's ability to make
policy recommendations and engage in lobbying efforts. Neighboring states share the problem of lack
of autonomy: "Substate ombudsmen Robyn O'Neill
of Suburban Cook County and Margaret Niederer
of Springfield both observed.., that the dependent
status of the [Illinois] program impedes its ultimate
132
effectiveness for change."
Furthermore, state ombudsman program officials
must improve the ratio of long-term care ombudsmen to nursing home beds. The 1994 Institute of
Medicine study recommends a ratio of one ombudsman to 2,000 beds.' Currently in Wisconsin, the
program has a ratio of approximately one ombudsman to 6,500 beds. 34
Moreover, the Wisconsin legal counsel should
have the opportunity to represent residents in the
appeals process. As the Institute of Medicine recommendations make clear, an "adequate legal counsel
[a]s an integral part of the ombudsman program"
encompasses two functions: First, the legal counsel
must "represent the program itself;" second, he or
she must "provide advice and counsel in matters related to long-term facility residents." 3 5 Currently,
the Wisconsin Board on Aging and Long-Term
Care legal counsel is active only in the second category; thus, the Wisconsin ombudsman program
is inadequate as regards Institute of Medicine
recommendations.
Finally, Wisconsin should alter its ombudsman
program philosophy to embrace the traditional conception of seeing the nursing home resident's family
members, in addition to the resident, as clients of
the state ombudsman program. Often the resident is
unable or unwilling to make complaints, therefore it
seems unreasonable not to allow family members to
utilize the ombudsman. In neighboring Illinois in

fiscal year 1992, family members made twenty-eight
percent of the complaints, while residents themselves
were responsible for only twenty-one percent of the
complaints, meaning that family members were more
likely than residents to contact the ombudsman.'

Conclusion
Because the lack of national standards for an ombudsman program has made it difficult to obtain
detailed information on state programs, there is inconsistency between the states. Currently, different
states have different levels of staff and volunteers,
and standards for state ombudsman programs are
3 7
minimal, both "among and within states."'
The Institute of Medicine recommends that the
United States Department of Human Services direct
all state offices for the Long-Term Care Ombudsmen to offer more detailed information in their
annual reports, including:
" The level of awareness of residents, their
agents, and other parties regarding the ombudsman program, and the availability of
ombudsmen to individual residents;
* The extent to which the complaints and concerns of residents have been satisfactorily
resolved;
* The extent to which ombudsmen have provided input into activities designed to
improve the overall system of care and services for long-term care residents; and
* The extent to which ombudsmen have improved the overall system of care and services
for long-term care residents. 3 '
The new administration must commit to funding the recommendations outlined in the Institute of
Medicine's 1994 study, "Real People Real Problems."
The most important of these include:
*

[T]hat the Assistant Secretary for Aging
explicitly operationalize the federal
government's responsibility for oversight of
the long-term care ombudsman program.
This should include (at a minimum) the
following elements of program oversight:
(1) active monitoring of programs by regional
offices or the central office of the Administration on Aging; (2) effective technical
assistance to the state programs; and (3)
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standards and procedures for training representatives of the Office of the State
Long-Term Care Ombudsman;
[T]hat the Assistant Secretary for Aging develop plans of action and cooperative
agreements with the Legal Services Corporation, the National Association of Protection
and Advocacy Systems, the National Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Units, and
the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services to
foster and encourage a variety of legal assistance resources for residents of long-term care
facilities. 13
Equally important, the Administration on Aging must commit to the creation and dissemination
of national guidelines for adequate funding of ombudsman programs.
The agency must also require individual states
to report effective and ineffective problem-solving
strategies, which would then be aggregated as a
shared resource for use by states. Such a resource
would allow states to avoid inefficiencies caused by
experimenting with methodologies rejected by other
states.
In conclusion, the time is ripe for a follow-up
examination by the Institute of Medicine, revisiting
the issues outlined in the 1994 study excerpted above.
In addition to retracing its investigation of successes
and failures, the institute should study alterations
wrought by the burgeoning problem of nursing facility bankruptcy, as well as changes resulting from
the growing influx of health-maintenance organizations (HMOs) in the long-term care environment.
The study should also detail any of the individual
states' structural conflicts in the placement of their
ombudsman programs-e.g., conflicts of interest
from a program's location within umbrella structures.
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